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Risk Communication: An Analysis of Message Source and Function in Hurricane 
Mitigation/Preparedness Communication 
Andrew M. Gallo 
ABSTRACT 
In September 2008, the National Weather Service (NWS) predicted that 
Hurricane Ike would make landfall on Galveston Island as a strong category three storm. 
This led the NWS to release a statement of ‘certain death’ if people did not adhere to the 
emergency evacuation messages. Millions of people fled the Texas coast. Using Hazleton 
and Long’s (1993) taxonomy of public relations strategies, experimental methods were 
conducted with various evacuation messages to test emergency communication. Grunig’s 
(1997) situational theory of publics was used to determine strategy influence. Problem 
recognition, constraint recognition, and level of involvement were tested.  In addition, 
tests were conducted to measure source expertise, trust, and attitude depending on the 
message source.  
Results indicated that a national message source produced higher constraint 
recognition than a local message source. The national message source produced higher 
expertise, trust, and attitude then a local message source. The threat and punishment 
strategy produced the highest level of information-seeking behavior. Information-seeking 
behavior was the lowest when a persuasive strategy was used. Constraint recognition 
produced the weakest effect on information-seeking behavior. In conclusion, emergency 
management communicators must use the correct message strategy to have an effect on 
information-seeking behavior. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
“All neighborhoods ... and possibly entire coastal communities ... will be 
inundated during the period of peak storm tide,” a National Weather Service (NWS) 
advisory said in wake of Hurricane Ike’s predicted landfall on Galveston Island in 
September 2008. “Persons not heeding evacuation orders in single-family one- or two-
story homes will face certain death.” The language of “certain death” created an 
unprecedented response from citizens all across the Gulf Coast, specifically residents in 
Texas, in the path of Hurricane Ike. Over one million people evacuated to places deemed 
structurally safe from the hurricane.  
The NWS wasn’t the only organization/agency communicating messages of this 
magnitude. The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary 
Michael Chertoff, “urged people not to succumb to hurricane fatigue,” in referring to 
concerns that authorities were overestimating Hurricane Ike's potential impact. He added, 
"unless you're fatigued with living, I suggest you want to take seriously a storm of this 
size and scale.” In addition to the NWS and DHS having similar messages about the 
possible destruction Hurricane Ike could bring, Houston’s Mayor Bill White responded to 
reports that people in mandatory evacuation areas planned on staying in their homes and 
urged them to reconsider. “If you think you want to ride something out, and people are 
talking about a 20-foot wall of water coming at you, then you better think again.”  
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 Message continuity at all levels of government is critical when dealing with 
hurricane mitigation and preparedness. A series of diverse evacuation messages during 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 ultimately led to deaths and thousands being stranded without 
food, water or humane conditions for days. In addition, the mismanagement of 
information about possible levee failures throughout the city during Hurricane Katrina 
poised agencies involved in Hurricane Ike to explain all possible outcomes related to the 
storm’s impact and to not recreate the scene that unfolded in New Orleans on national 
television.  
 Ineffective emergency communication during Hurricane Katrina led to one of the 
biggest failures of our government. However, what motivates citizens to respond to 
certain messages and not others? What type of sources and messages provoke different 
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors? Will complacency outweigh hurricane preparedness and 
mitigation? Will the aftermath of Hurricane Ike support the threatening messages used by 
the NWS and others? Should “certain death” language be used again in emergency 
communication?  It’s critical to understand the attributes of hurricane preparedness and 
mitigation messages to diminish future risks. The NWS plays a vital role in emergency 
communication. It is often the main source for information regarding future hurricane 
projections, track, strength, storm surge, and other hurricane related factors.  
 The NWS, a division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
released a hurricane preparedness guide that stated that one of the major problems with 
hurricanes making landfall in the United States is resident’s perception of risk associated 
with these storms. It indicates several reasons for lack of preparedness and mitigation 
procedures. Besides infrastructure problems related to urban sprawl, a high percentage of 
3 
 
the population living along hurricane prone areas have only experienced “weaker” storms 
and not experienced the “major” storms that cause catastrophic damage. This has led 
many individuals to downplay the need to evacuate and remain complacent when experts 
urge residents to vacate at risk areas.  
This study seeks to further understanding of the effects of emergency message 
strategies and message sources on individuals. The importance of understanding message 
effects in emergency communication is clear. The findings from this study may provide 
information about how communicators can best structure their messages to ensure the 
safety of the public. 
 This study explores message strategy effects in an emergency communication 
context using Hazleton and Long’s 1993 public relations process model and Grunig’s 
1997 situational theory of publics. The public relations message strategies examined in 
this study were derived from Hazleton and Long’s public relations process model. 
Hazleton developed a taxonomy of seven public relations strategies that organizations use 
when communicating with publics. The seven strategies are: facilitative, informative, 
persuasive, promise and reward, threat and punishment, bargaining, and cooperative 
problem solving. 
 Grunig’s situational theory of publics is used to understand publics and measure 
their opinions about issues. Grunig and Hunt (1984) stated that communication behaviors 
of publics can be best understood by measuring how members of publics perceive 
situations in which they are affected. The theory consists of three independent variables 
and two dependent variables. The three independent variables are problem recognition, 
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constraint recognition, and level of involvement. These variables describe “perceptions 
that people have of specific situations, especially situations that are problematic or that 
produce conflicts or issues” (Grunig, 1997, p. 10). The dependent variables are 
information seeking and information processing. 
 The purpose of this study is to understand what strategy type and message source 
is most effective in emergency management communications. Below are the hypotheses 
and propositions this study tests. 
H1: In emergency communication, message source will influence receiver variables. 
P1.1: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher problem recognition 
than a local message source (HCG). 
P1.2: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher constraint 
recognition than a local message source (HCG). 
P1.3: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher level of involvement 
then a local message source (HCG). 
P1.4: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher expertise then a local 
message source (HCG). 
P1.5: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher trust than a local 
message source (HCG). 
P1.6: A national message source (NWS) will produce more positive attitudes than 
a local message source (HCG). 
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P1.7: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher information-seeking 
than a local message source (HCG). 
H2: In emergency communication, message strategy will influence receiver variables. 
P2.1: Information seeking will be the highest when the threat and punishment 
strategy is used. 
P2.2: Information seeking will be the lowest when the informative strategy is 
used. 
H3: Level of involvement will produce the strongest effect on information seeking 
behavior. 
H4: Constraint recognition will produce the weakest effect on information seeking 
behavior.  
 The following chapter provides a review of literature important to this study. 
Chapter 3 explains the methods and procedures used to gather data for this study. Chapter 
4 reviews the results of this study, and Chapter 5 provides discussion of the results and 
draws conclusions about the findings of this study. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
The purpose of this study is to understand what strategy type and message source 
is most effective in emergency management communications. This chapter reviews the 
existing literature relevant to this investigation. 
Emergency Management 
Emergency management communications is “the dissemination of timely and 
accurate information to the general public, elected and community officials and the 
media. This plays a major role in the effective management of disaster response and 
recovery activities” (Haddow & Bullock, 2003, p. 63). The four phases of emergency 
management are mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Figure 1 indicates the 
flow of different phases in emergency communication when a disaster occurs.  
Figure 1: Four Phases of Emergency Communication1 
 
 Communication is critical in the mitigation and preparedness phases of 
                                                            
1 Source: http://perryema.deltafour.com/images/4phases.JPG 
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emergency management. The mitigation phase focuses on preemptive measures that can 
minimize the damage of a disaster. Mitigation activities are not done overnight. These are 
planned activities in advance of a known risk. An example is identifying what schools are 
deemed hurricane shelters and how many residents each school can accommodate. 
“Federal, state, and local government agencies play a prominent role during this phase 
and, in general, are responsible for setting the agenda, engaging the appropriate players in 
planning and establishing and enforcing rules and regulations to achieve agreed-on plans” 
(Guion, Scammon, & Borders, 2007, p. 21). Mitigation promotes the implementation of 
strategies, technologies, and actions that will reduce the loss of lives and property 
damage in future disasters (Haddow & Bullock, 2003).  
 Preparedness focuses on reducing the negative outcomes of disasters. One of the 
main characteristics of this phase is “disseminating messages aimed at encouraging 
people to make choices about protective behaviors and monitoring compliance with 
community plans” (Guion, et al., 2007, p. 21). “During this phase, government agencies 
are responsible for ensuring the safety of people in the disaster area and the environment” 
(p. 21). An example of the preparedness phase is when the National Weather Service 
sends out information regarding tropical storm and hurricane warnings. Below lists the 
different characteristics of emergency management at each phase according to Guion, 
Scammon and Borders, 2007, p 21. 
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Table 1: Major Participants in Emergency Management in Disaster Phases 
 
 Even though communication messages are disseminated at all phases of 
emergency management, this study focuses on the type of messages that get people to act 
prior to a potential disaster. The response and recovery phases of emergency management 
are exercised when the disaster is happening or has taken place. It includes search and 
rescue, support labor and the coordination of aid programs at the response phase, and 
shelter coordination and job/training resources at the recovery phase. 
Hurricane Classification 
 The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a rating system that measures a hurricane’s 
intensity. The scale classifies hurricanes as category 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 storms. The type of 
potential damage depends on the classification. The scale of potential damage ranges 
from minimal to catastrophic. Each number estimates the scale of property damage as 
related to the strength of the hurricane. Hurricanes classified as categories 3, 4, or 5 are 
considered major hurricanes because of the possibility of property damage and loss of 
life. Also, the scale gives an accurate representation of the amount and type of property 
damage and flooding to expect. The wind speed is the primary factor of the scale. Below, 
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Figure 2 gives a detailed description of the level of damage a storm can bring by category 
classification. 
Figure 2: Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale2 
Category Damage Level Description Example 
 
 
1 
 
 
Minimal 
Damage primarily to shrubbery, trees, foliage, and 
unanchored homes. No real damage to other structures. 
Some damage to poorly constructed signs. Low-lying coastal 
roads inundated, minor pier damage, some small craft in 
exposed anchorage torn from moorings. 
 
 
Hurricane Earl (1998) 
 
 
2 
 
 
Moderate 
Considerable damage to shrubbery and tree foliage; some 
trees blown down. Major damage to exposed mobile homes. 
Extensive damage to poorly constructed signs. Some damage 
of roofing materials of buildings; some window and door 
damage. No major damage to buildings. Coast roads and 
low-lying escape routes inland cut by rising water 2 to 4 
hours before arrival of hurricane center. Considerable 
damage to piers. Marinas flooded. Small craft in unprotected 
anchorages torn from moorings. Evacuation of some 
shoreline residences and low-lying areas required. 
 
 
Hurricane Georges 
(1998) 
 
 
3 
 
 
Extensive 
Foliage torn from trees; large trees blown down. Practically 
all poorly constructed signs blown down. Some damage of 
roofing materials of buildings; some window and door 
damage. Some structural damage to small buildings. Mobile 
homes destroyed. Serious flooding at coast and many smaller 
structures near coast destroyed; larger structures near coast 
damaged by battering waves and floating debris. Low-lying 
escape routes inland cut by rising water 3 to 5 hours before 
hurricane center arrives. Flat terrain 5 feet or less above sea 
level flooded inland 8 miles or more. Evacuation of low-lying 
residences within several blocks of shoreline possibly 
required. 
 
 
Hurricane Fran (1996) 
 
 
4 
 
 
Extreme 
Shrubs and trees blown down; all signs down. Extensive 
damage to roofing materials, windows and doors. Complete 
failures of roofs on many small residences. Complete 
destruction of mobile homes. Flat terrain 10 feet or less 
above sea level flooded inland as far as 6 miles. Major 
damage to lower floors of structures near shore due to 
flooding and battering waves and floating debris. Low-lying 
escape routes inland cut by rising water 3 to 5 hours before 
hurricane center arrives. Major erosion of beaches. Massive 
evacuation of all residences within 500 yards of shore 
possibly required and of single story residences within 2 
miles of shore. 
 
 
Hurricane Andrew 
(1992) 
 
5 
 
Catastrophic 
Shrubs and trees blown down; considerable damage to roofs 
of buildings; all signs down. Very severe and extensive 
damage to windows and doors. Complete failure of roofs on 
many residences and industrial buildings. Extensive 
shattering of glass in windows and doors. Some complete 
building failures. Small buildings overturned or blown away. 
Complete destruction of mobile homes. Major damage to 
lower floors of all structures less than 15 feet above sea level 
within 500 yards of shore. Low-lying escape routes inland cut 
by rising water 3 to 5 hours before hurricane center arrives. 
Massive evacuation of residential areas on low ground within 
5 to 10 miles of shore possibly required. 
 
Hurricane Camille 
(1969) 
 
  
                                                            
2 http://www.earlyalert.com/images/Saffir-SimpsonDamage.jpg 
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Hurricane Characteristics 
When a hurricane makes landfall, the magnitude of destruction is determined by a 
variety of factors. These factors include storm surge, storm tide, wind, tornadoes and 
inland/freshwater flooding. The level of impact is determined by the strength of the 
storm. 
Defined by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
storm surge “is a large dome of water often 50 to 100 miles wide that sweeps across the 
coastline near where a hurricane makes landfall” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2001, 
p. 5). The top of the dome consists of battering waves. The impact varies depending on 
the strength of the storm and the water level surrounding the coastline in which the 
hurricane will make landfall. The more shallow the water is, combined with strength, 
determines the height of the surge.  
Another factor that determines the impact of a hurricane is storm tide. This is a 
combination between storm surge and astronomical tide. The time that a storm makes 
landfall determines the effect of storm tide. If a hurricane makes landfall during high tide 
the results can be more devastating in terms of property damage and loss of life. Figure 3 
documents the difference tides can make on storm surge impact. 
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Figure 3: Storm Tide Diagram3 
 
The main determinant of the Saffir-Simpson Scale as previously mentioned is 
wind. A tropical storm becomes a hurricane when winds are measured at a sustained 74 
mph or greater. Winds can make ordinary signs, outdoor furniture, lawn decors, etc. into 
flying missiles. In addition, winds can be sustained well inland from the initial of landfall 
of the storm.  
Figure 4: Parts of a Hurricane 
 
The final impact determinant is inland/freshwater flooding. Depending on the 
                                                            
3 Source: http://www.photographers1.com/Sailing/StormSurge.png 
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speed of the storm, hurricanes can produce an excessive amount of rainfall in a short 
period of time. Flooding is often a major concern for inland residents. Large amounts of 
rainfall over a short period of time can also trigger mudslides in more mountainous 
regions along the East coast of the United States. According to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (2001), freshwater flooding has accounted for 59% of U.S hurricane deaths 
between 1970 and 1999 (p. 7). One of the main reasons is flash flooding. Flash floods 
occur when there is a rapid rise in water levels due to substantial rainfall in a short 
amount of time.  
These five elements determine the potential impact of a hurricane. Mitigation and 
preparedness communication informs residents about these attributes and how best to 
protect themselves and their property. 
Hurricane Watches/Warnings 
Once a storm is identified, the National Weather Service releases a series of 
advisories regarding the possibility of a tropical storm or hurricane making landfall along 
the coast of the United States. According to the NWS, an advisory is official information 
issued by the National Hurricane Center describing all watches and warnings in effect 
and provides details concerning location, intensity, movement, and precautions that 
should be taken. These advisories describe the storms potential landfall location by 
issuing four different classifications: tropical storm watch, tropical storm warning, 
hurricane watch, and hurricane warning. The NWS Web site defines these terms which 
are provided in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: Tropical Storm/Hurricane Watches & Warnings4 
Type Description 
Tropical Storm Watch  Tropical storm conditions with sustained 
winds from 39 to 73 mph are possible in 
the watch area with the next 36 hours. 
Tropical Storm Warning  Tropical storm conditions are expected in 
the warning area within the next 24 hours. 
Hurricane Watch  Hurricane conditions (sustained winds 
greater than 73 mph) are possible in the 
watch area within 36 hours. 
Hurricane Warning  Hurricane conditions are expected in the 
warning area in 24 hours or less. 
 
 
 After these watches and warnings are in place, the NWS will make predictions 
based on various models about the possible landfall location of the storm. These models 
are often combined on a single chart to produce a spaghetti model. This model allows you 
to see the predicted direction of the storm by a variety of computer models and hone in 
on the consensus direction of the storm. See Figure. 
Figure 5: Spaghetti Tracking Model5 
 
This is often described as the “cone of uncertainty.” The “cone of uncertainty,” shown in 
                                                            
4 Source: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutgloss.shtml 
5 Source: http://my.sfwmd.gov/sfwmd/common/images/weather/plots.html 
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Figure 6, takes all the forecast tracks from a variety of different models and concentrates 
on a specific area. Once that area has been identified, the local government enacts their 
emergency preparedness plans and communicates with the public.  
Figure 6: Cone of Uncertainty6 
 
 
The risk communication literature review is divided into two sections. The first 
section focuses on risk communication literature and Hazleton’s (1993) taxonomy of 
public relations strategies. In studying past risk communication literature, it is important 
to identify the right variables to measure and common language used. The first two 
sections will focus on the message. The second section of the literature review will focus 
on Grunig’s (1997) situational theory of publics.  
Risk Communication 
 There are numerous definitions for risk communication. Covelo (1992) defined 
risk communication as “the exchange of information among invested parties about the 
nature, magnitude, significance, or control of risk (p. 359). This involves “the act of 
conveying or transmitting information between interested parties about levels of health or 
                                                            
6 Source: http://dpulling.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/cone-of-uncertainty.gif 
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environmental risks; the significance or meanings of such risks; or decisions, actions, or 
policies aimed at managing or controlling such risks” (Davies, Covello, & Allen, 1987, p. 
112). 
 Many risk communication studies use the definition of the National Research 
Council (1989). They defined risk communication as  
“an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among 
individuals, groups, and institutions. It involves multiple messages about the 
nature of risk and other messages, not strictly about risk, that express concerns, 
opinions, or reactions to risk messages or to legal and institutional arrangements 
for risk management” (p. 21).  
This definition stresses the importance of communication to all possible 
stakeholders. “Stakeholder involvement is pivotal in the development of a dialogue 
intended to result in a risk management or mitigation consensus” (Cole & Fellows, 2008, 
p. 214).  
 In addition, Palenchar (2005) stated that “risk communication provides the 
opportunity to understand and appreciate stakeholders’ concerns related to risks 
generated by organizations to engage in dialogue to address differences and concerns, 
carry out appropriate actions that can reduce perceived risks, and create a climate of 
participatory and effective discourse to increase harmony and mutuality” (p. 752-753).  
 It is critical to understand how to communicate this information. Heath and Abel 
(1996) noted that risk communication studies often center upon how technical experts 
frame and present technical information to concerned publics in language they can 
understand. The National Research Council (1989) stated that risk communication is 
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“successful only to the extent that it raises the level of understanding of relevant issues or 
actions and satisfies those involved that they are adequately informed within the limits of 
available knowledge” (p. 21). Satisfaction of risk communication messages relies on two 
components. Cole and Fellows (2008, as cited in Rowan 1991) stated that “first, it must 
communicate the probabilities and consequences of known risks to affected audiences” 
(p. 213). This is a critical part of risk communication. The risk communicators must 
present information to the public to instill an act of urgency in mitigation and 
preparedness phases. Second, “it should seek consensus among these audiences regarding 
a specific course of response and mitigation” (p. 213). It is important to have one 
message strategy when communicating risks. Once various messages enter the public 
sphere, the public is unsure of the issue and what source to believe. Two common themes 
emerged in risk communication literature: trust and credibility. 
 Trust and credibility are important components in risk communication. “The 
source of an organization’s perceived trust and credibility comes from its ability to care, 
competent commitment to solve the risk, honesty, and expertise” (Cole & Fellows, 2008, 
p.214). Spokespersons, either local or national, must be trusted in communicating this 
information. “Residents who demonstrated trust in industry and emergency response 
personnel were more likely to gather information, be knowledgeable, and exhibit positive 
behavioral intentions regarding emergency response procedures” (Palenchar & Heath, 
2002). The more trust individuals have in these officials, the more likely they will be 
proactive in adhering to their message. Having universal trust is important. The risk 
communicator must know how to communicate to the various publics that will potentially 
be affected by the risk. “Risk communication becomes a tool for communication values 
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and identities as much as being about the awareness, attitudes, and behaviors related to 
the risk itself” (Palenchar & Heath, 2007, p.127). The public has to relate to the 
individual disseminating the message.  
 Another aspect of risk communication is care communication. In care 
communication, “risks are already known to the audience or appropriate experts, and 
risks for which management processes are scientifically determined and accepted by the 
audience” (Cole & Fellows, 2008, p.213). This message strategy is informative rather 
than persuasive. Using Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans levees as an example, 
Cole and Fellows (2008, cite Lundgren and McMakin, 2004) that the objective of care 
communication is to alert an audience to the presence of a risk and to advise appropriate 
risk avoidance behavior.  
 The core focus of my study was derived from two hurricanes: Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005 and Hurricane Ike in 2008. These two storms, similar in size, but not strength 
garnered two different response plans. Hurricane Katrina was an awful display of 
emergency management and Hurricane Ike was a strong representation of message 
affects and coordination and trust in the source of the message as well as the message 
itself. Cole and Fellows (2008) highlighted the poor display of emergency management 
mitigation and preparedness during Hurricane Katrina. 
 Cole and Fellows (2008) conducted a case study that documented the risk 
communication failures during Hurricane Katrina (2005) in the city of New Orleans. 
They concluded that inadequate clarity, insufficient credibility, and failure to properly 
adapt to critical audiences resulted in a failure of consensus communication and crisis 
communication (p. 211). Their findings highlighted some important issues in risk 
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communication. They found that crisis messages were inadequate, message preparation 
prior to the crisis is essential, effective messages must be delivered by credible sources, 
and messages must be adapted to encompass a wide variety of different demographic 
characteristics.  
 “Risk communicators are faced with the dual challenge of translating existing and 
emergent technical and/or scientific material regarding the anticipated event into lay 
person’s terms and arousing an understanding of the severity of the potential 
consequences an event may have on the populace” (Cole & Fellows, 2008, p. 211-212). 
Due to the difficulty of forecasting landfall coordinates of hurricanes days out, 
meteorologists predict the different characteristics of these storms such as paths, landfall, 
and strength. “Individuals who do not perceive the risk as personally relevant may 
minimize such messages” (p. 212).  
 In order to have a better understanding of the core principles of risk 
communications, studies must be conducted to document the challenges/mishaps. During 
Hurricane Katrina, people were hesitant to leave their valuables behind and received 
unclear messages from officials or the lacked knowledge on how to evacuate. According 
to Cole and Fellows (2008), “hurricane roulette” was present during Hurricane Katrina. 
This means that citizens felt lucky they would be able to ride out the storm. Conflicting 
evacuation messages left vague and uncertain understanding of what to do and what was 
required. “When individuals perceive themselves at risk, their ability to comprehend and 
to process information declines significantly” (Cole & Fellows, 2008, p. 224). Language 
used in these messages conveyed several meanings. Another variable that led to many not 
evacuating was the lack of spokesperson credibility. This led to people not trusting the 
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messages they received. Messages must be credible from credible people or 
organizations.   
 Another important aspect of understanding risk communication messages is use of 
common vocabulary. Hurricane Katrina communication messages were filled with 
confusing advisory language and inconsistent messages. This includes adapting these 
messages to a variety of target audiences. Factors involved in target audiences are 
income, education, race, ethnicity, and residential location.  In risk communication, it is 
important that the communicator understand the various target audiences that will be 
receiving the message and how to respond to their needs. Cole and Fellows (2008) study 
featured different factors that led individuals to not respond to risk management 
messages. These are past experiences, trust in public officials, lack of knowledge, 
vocabulary, target audience, and the role of media.  
Past Experience 
 Dombroski, Fischhoff, and Fischbeck (2006) offer a general approach to 
predicting public compliance with emergency recommendations (p. 1675). The approach 
starts with a general risk assessment that includes factors that could affect behavior. The 
implications of these factors should be used to improve emergency risk assessment 
models and improve preparedness for disasters. Different variables play different factors 
in risk preparedness. Baker (1991) concluded the most important determinants are actual 
risk levels, citizen’s beliefs that their homes are at high risk, and official 
recommendations and warnings. The impact of many variables, including risk area, 
evacuation notices, housing, storm threat information, hurricane probability forecasts, 
hurricane experience, length of residence, hurricane awareness, crying wolf, and 
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demographics have an effect on preparedness.  
Past experience factors into whether you respond to risk communication 
mitigation and preparedness messages. Siegrist and Gutscher (2008) investigated the 
affects of past experience on mitigation behavior. Results suggested that “people without 
flood experience envisioned the consequences of a flood differently from people who had 
actually experienced severe losses due to a flood” (p. 771). Weinstein (1989) said that 
“past experience seems to be an important factor influencing people’s perception of 
hazards” (p. 772). On the contrary, people who had not been affected by a flood strongly 
underestimated its effect. Mitigation campaigns are needed to increase knowledge about 
these risks. “Risk communication must not focus solely on technical aspects, in order to 
trigger motivation for mitigation behavior, successful communication must also help 
people to envision the negative emotional consequences of natural disasters” (Weinstein, 
1989, p. 771). This study highlighted the need for people to understand that non-
experience should not equate to low knowledge of a potential hazard and what you can 
do to protect yourself and your property. People can be knowledgeable about disaster 
risks and still not have the motivation to act accordingly. 
 Kapuca (2008) examined the role of household preparedness in response to 
disasters. Findings suggested that household and individual preparedness is an important 
factor in preparedness for natural disasters. Kapuca’s study reconfirms a common theme 
in risk communications: complacency. Kapuca found that “households, even with 
significant experience with disasters, can be complacent in response to disasters” (p. 
526). Why does personal experience lead to complacency? 
 Martin, Bender, and Raish (2007) investigated the cognitive perceptual process 
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people go through when faced with risks. The variables they looked at were the role of 
motivation, decision stages of risk readiness, and subjective knowledge. Subjective 
knowledge, based on someone’s direct or indirect experience, was essential in 
preparedness. They investigated a number of risk-mitigating actions taken by those in 
risk situations. They concluded that “personal experience can have a powerful impact on 
recognition of risk and the willingness to protect oneself from risk” (p. 897). These past 
experiences become the basis for individual beliefs in their own knowledge about risk. 
 Halpern, Millstein, Ellen, Adler, Tschann, and Biehl (2001) found that 
“participants who had experienced a natural disaster or engaged in a particular risk 
behavior estimated their chance of experiencing a negative outcome resulting from that 
event or behavior as less likely then individuals without such experience” (p. 120). The 
findings suggest that behavioral experiences drive risk judgments.  
Trust and Credibility 
 An important aspect in risk communication is the source of the message and the 
perceived trustworthiness of the source. During Hurricane Katrina, a segment of the 
population of New Orleans didn’t trust officials disseminating the evacuation messages. 
This was because different federal, state, and local officials were disseminating different 
messages to the same audience. In addition, it’s important to understand how trust can be 
built around these issues. 
 Heath and Abel (1996) discovered “that communities that engage in more 
extensive efforts to create emergency response systems and inform residents of those 
measures increase the risk of tolerance of community members” (p. 151). They 
concluded, “when community officials provide emergency response systems and the 
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information citizens need to protect themselves in the event of an emergency those efforts 
can be demonstrated to foster support for the industry” (p. 151). The argument here is 
that “responsible parties -- industry and government -- in communities where potentially 
dramatic risks exist are wise to acknowledge those risks and to work proactively to 
inform members of the public about the protective measures they can take in the event of 
emergency” (p. 153).  
 Risk communicators must be proactive in the way they disseminate information to 
the public. This involves knowing that a risk exists from the declaration of experts in the 
field. Heath and Abel (1996) found that “although community members are concerned 
that unfavorable events will occur, they believe emergency response personnel are 
prepared to respond properly” (p. 158).  
 In addition, Heath and Abel’s (1996) found that television messages were the 
preferred way to be contacted by emergency response personnel. A key aspect of their 
findings was how respondents trusted government officials. Respondents “seem to trust 
their own judgment more than that of officials or do not know the advantages of taking 
the emergency response measures recommended by emergency response experts” (p. 
165). They concluded that “people may trust government and industry more when those 
entities acknowledge potential dangers and give proactive solutions to problems rather 
than attempt to downplay them by stressing the improbability that emergencies will 
occur” (p. 170). 
Lack of Knowledge 
 Lack of knowledge also has been found to impact people’s response to emergency 
situations. Previous research suggests that people did not know what to do during an 
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emergency.  According to Heath and Abel (1996) “Residents believe government 
officials are prepared to respond properly and to serve as credible sources of opinion” (p. 
166). Trust is a fluid attribute the public looks for in government officials. 
 Baker (1995) studied the effect of hurricane probabilities on public response. 
Numerous hypothetical threat scenarios were used to assess hurricane probability 
forecasts and risk variables associated with public response. “The most important 
practical finding in hurricane preparedness is the local officials’ advice or orders 
regarding evacuation (p. 146). “This was the most important element affecting 
evacuation, regardless of whether probabilities are included in people’s information of 
not” (Baker, 1995, p. 146). The importance of trust in public officials was critical to the 
outcome of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Residents said that they had the least trust for 
public officials and the messages they were disseminating. Baker (1995) found that 
people often feel that they are more knowledgeable than public officials in mitigation and 
preparedness activities. 
 Heath and Palenchar (2000) found that because “concern remains high that risk 
events are likely to occur and harm community safety, citizens are willing to become 
knowledgeable of emergency response measures” (p. 131). This knowledge “gives 
citizens a greater sense of control, which may translate into trust for industry and city 
emergency response efforts” (p. 131). Mitigation campaigns can build trust in favor of 
community and government officials. 
 McEntire and Myers (2007) discussed what local governments must do to prepare 
for various disasters. They identified a step-by-step approach to establish a process of 
local ordinances, assessing risk, creating emergency operations plans, and educating the 
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public.  
 Through the mitigation phase, “effective public relations efforts can build 
community support through collaborative, community-based decisions regarding the 
kinds of risks that exist, and the emergency response measures that can be initiated as 
needed for public safety” (Heath & Palenchar, 2000, p. 132). According to the authors, 
risk management, perception, and communication research address five themes. These 
themes are the likelihood that specific risks will occur, who will be affected if they occur, 
magnitude of effect, mitigation of the occurrence, and mitigation of impact.   
 One of the primary goals of the practitioner is to disseminate information to 
“potentially affected communities so that they know that emergency warning and 
response systems are in place and that measures can be taken to reduce personal exposure 
to the risk if it occurs” (p. 135). According to Heath (1995), “risk communication 
campaigns are best when they are coupled with community relations efforts that include 
messages that respond to citizens’ desire to know what to do to increase their safety in the 
event of a health or life threatening emergency” (p. 135). 
 Some of the key variables in these campaigns are trust and cognitive involvement. 
“Trust is a central factor in predicting whether members of a community accept and rely 
on the conclusions and recommendations of people who are trained in science, business 
operations, engineering, and emergency management.” (Heath, 1995, p. 135) Cognitive 
involvement states that the “more people believe that some dire consequence can result, 
the greater their level of cognitive involvement” (p. 136).  
 Some characteristics of individuals who are cognitively involved are that they 
“acquire, pause to consider, and evaluate information more thoroughly” (Heath, 1995, p. 
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136). An interesting result of the study showed that “people who are cognitively involved 
have a higher sense of risk, are less trusting of government and industry officials” (p. 
149). Public officials must understand the different comprehension levels between 
professional risk communicators and the general population. 
 Knocke and Kolivras (2007) studied flash flood awareness in southwest Virginia. 
They concluded that there is a “knowledge gap between flood experts and the general 
public about the level of perceived risk that the latter has toward the powerful flood 
waters” (p. 155). The knowledge gap affects communication capabilities and efficiency 
of the warning process. Their research found that even though people had knowledge of 
flash floods, it wasn’t enough to garnered a proper level of awareness. To effectively 
communicate this information to the public, new warning methods must be developed.  
Vocabulary 
 Vocabulary plays an important part in how individuals understand mitigation and 
preparedness messages. It must consist of general terms that the majority of the 
population can comprehend. Communicating a message with unclear language can cause 
individuals not to take the recommended action. 
 Hellier, Aldrich, Wright, Daunt, and Edworthy (2007) studied warning signal 
words and the meaning of their usage. These signals are often used on “warning signs and 
labels to denote the level of hazard implied by the situation they indicate” (p. 323). They 
conducted a multidimensional analysis of rating 17 signal words. In doing so, three 
dimensions emerged: the level of hazard implied by the signal words, the extent to which 
they explicitly implied risk and the explicitness of the instruction given.  
 The results support a general code of using certain signal words for certain 
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hazards. This “suggests that that there might be utility in mapping signal words to the 
conditions that they indicate in terms of the extent to which the situation or product 
constitutes explicit risk” (Hellier, et al., p. 323). Citing Wogalter and Silver (1990), they 
argue that signal words recommended for use are too limited in number and are over 
used. This results in desensitization to them and habituation. However, previous research 
studies have revealed a consistent relationship between signal words and perceived 
hazards. This research “supports the use of signal words in warning implementation to 
quantify hazard and also suggest that the dimensionality of signal words can be further 
refined to include not only hazard but also the explicitness with which risk is implied” (p. 
337). Common vocabulary needs to be agreed and used among various stakeholder 
organizations.  
 Manoj and Baker (2007) discussed the lack of common vocabulary between 
response organizations, organizations and citizens. This can be attributed to the problems 
related with mitigation and preparedness. They indicate that the primary challenge in 
responding to both natural and man-made disasters is communication. 
 The use of signal words and warnings were echoed during Hurricane Ike. The 
same message was being disseminated through all communication channels. It will be 
interesting to see if ‘certain death’ language will face desensitization due to prior use and 
the outcome ‘better than expected’ outcome of the Hurricane Ike. 
Target Audience 
 When communicating risk mitigation and preparedness messages, it is apparent 
that the communicator knows their target audiences and how best to communicate with 
them. Highlighted in the mess that followed Hurricane Katrina, it is important that all 
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demographics are receiving the same message regardless of ethnicity, religion, gender, 
socio-economic status, etc. It was evident in New Orleans that the African-American 
population wasn’t communicated with effectively.  
 Eisenman, Cordasco, Asch, Golden, and Glik (2007) studied the factors that 
influenced evacuation decisions in impoverished communities. Using Hurricane Katrina 
as a case study, they indicated that family, friends, and community organizations played a 
positive and negative role evacuation decisions. Through a series of qualitative 
interviews, they concluded that disaster plans must account for situations in less affluent 
communities. Questioning the orders of local officials, one respondent said, “the last 
storm we had there, it was more people got hurt on the highway traveling away from the 
storm, running out of gas, accidents, than it would have been if they stayed home” (p. 
S111). The obstacles they encountered should lead to new strategies that have an 
emphasis on community-based communication and preparation strategies. Subjective 
norms also played a role in whether to evacuate. 
 McIvor and Paton (2007) sought to further develop a model for natural hazard 
preparedness. They examined the role of attitudes, mitigation and social norms plays in 
natural hazards. Their study examined “whether social-cultural factors influence the 
decisions people make regarding their relationship with natural hazards” (p. 79). People’s 
attitudes and social norms influence their perception of these hazards and ultimately how 
they prepare for them.  
 McIvor and Paton (2007) concluded that mitigation activities must be on-going 
within the community in future risk communication: “People living in communities at 
risk from natural hazards continue to demonstrate poor knowledge of risk mitigation 
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procedures and a reticence to adopt protective measures” (pp. 79-80). It is important to 
know your target audience when developing risk communication messages. “Perceptions 
of risks and hazards are culturally and socially constructed; people interpret it in the 
context of their experience, beliefs, and expectations” (p. 80). Subjective norms and 
attitudes influence the efficacy of engaging in risk mitigating behavior. Knowing how to 
communicate to your target audience is critical.  
 Connelly and Knuth (1998) studied how information format can influence the 
extent to which target audiences understand and respond to risk-related information. The 
“purpose of the study was to measure anglers’ perceptions and anticipated responses to 
various health advisory presentation formats so that risk communicators producing 
advisories could consider likely audience response when preparing information for 
anglers” (p. 652). Their study examined four components of risk information 
presentation: reading level, diagram vs. text, tone, use of information. They stated that 
“the manner in which risk information is presented to target audiences is a critical 
influence on their ultimate response in terms of attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions 
related to the risk” (p.650). Doing research on your audience “regarding information 
needs and communication formats may help clarify which approaches to take” (p. 649). 
They found that the use of graphics could improve the understanding of risk information 
by certain audiences. In addition, the study found that there is no consensus 
communication strategy that has similar effects on all target audiences. The media also 
plays an important role in risk communications. 
Media 
 Perez-Lugo (2004) analyzed the role of the media in the sociology of natural 
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disasters. Media has been “mainly viewed as management tools used to influence 
people’s preparedness and response to natural disasters” (p. 210). Focusing in on the 
media-audience relationship during natural disasters, it was revealed that “media also 
have latent functions in disasters, which consist of emotional support and 
companionship” (p.222).  
 Perez-Lugo (2004) concluded that disaster research points out the role of the mass 
media during disasters as crucial in disseminating information in a quick efficient 
manner. “There importance lies in their power to increase preparedness and facilitate 
recovery by changing people’s attitudes about natural hazards” (p. 211). Mitigation and 
preparedness is key when dealing with risk communications. During the mitigation 
phase, “the media are considered a disaster information provider through coverage of 
non-local disasters, which helps the community raise disaster awareness and prepare for 
future events” (p. 212). In the preparedness phase, “the mass media provide factual 
information about the approaching hazard and tips to prepare for its impact” (p. 212).  
 Through quantitative interviews, the study found a lack of interest in the 
preparedness phase. “Instead of looking for ways on how to secure life and property, they 
wanted the physical location of the hurricane” (Perez-Lugo, 2004, p. 218). People said 
they take action based on previous personal and collective experiences with hurricanes. 
“The media-audience relationship remains a very important aspect of the people’s coping 
strategies during disasters” (p. 223). Many news organizations have the capabilities to 
broadcast live in disaster situations.  
 “Media presence during Hurricane Katrina allowed the world not only to see the 
atrocities experienced by the evacuees but also to see clearly and repeatedly the 
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contradictions and failings by all levels of government” (Guion, et al., 2007, p. 23). The 
mass media serve various functions for society, one of which is a channel for emergency 
managers to disseminate information in times of imminent danger (p. 25). Media 
disseminate this information voluntarily. Mass media can play a critical role during the 
mitigation phase because media coverage contributes to the formation of public attitudes, 
which in turn influence legislative actions (p. 21). Citing Fishman and Casarett (2006), 
Guion, et al. (2007) noted that this information can shape beliefs, attitudes, and perceived 
norms and can subsequently influence behavior.  
Public Relations Strategies 
 Hazleton (1993) noted that symbols are the primary means of accomplishing 
public relations. In order to better understand how symbols are developed and used for 
the purpose of communicating with others (p. 89), Hazleton developed a matrix to 
analyze public relations symbols. The function element of the matrix associates the 
audience and the assumptions about message affects (Hazleton, 1993). Characteristics of 
the audience must be taken into account in the classification of these messages according 
to their functional characteristics (Hazleton, 1993). This allows communicators to 
postulate about motivational, cognitive, and behavioral characteristics of audiences 
(Hazleton, 1993). 
 The matrix also analyzes message effects and message processing at the 
psychological level. These “messages may be understood as objects to be understood by 
individuals” (Hazleton, 1993 p. 91). The psychological level is most apparent in the 
public relations strategic planning process. This level seeks to understand how people 
respond to and understand communication (Hazleton, 1993). Organizations use symbols 
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to accomplish goals related to the public relations function. The functions proposed at 
this level represent “the goals of public relations in terms of the impact and meaning of 
messages to individual recipients” (p. 94).  
 Influenced by the social change literature of Zaltman and Duncan (1976), 
Hazleton derived four message functions that may accurately capture mass media based 
strategies (Hazleton, 1993). He also developed two message functions based on Grunig’s 
two-way symmetrical and two-way asymmetrical public relations models. These are the 
most commonly used in public relations strategy creation at the psychological level. 
Hazleton used these six functions to develop a taxonomy of public relations strategies 
that organizations typically use when communicating with publics (Werder, 2006). The 
seven strategies are: facilitative, informative, persuasive, promise and reward, threat and 
punishment, bargaining, and cooperative problem solving. The definitions Hazleton 
(1993) used to describe these strategies are provided below.  
Facilitative 
 A facilitative strategy is accomplished by making resources available to an 
audience that allow them to act in ways that they are already predisposed to act. 
Resources may be tangible artifacts, such as tools or money, or they may be directions 
which tell someone how to accomplish a particular action. 
Informative 
 An informative strategy is based upon the presentation of unbiased facts. This 
strategy does not draw conclusions, but presume that the audience will infer appropriate 
conclusions from accurate data. Informative messages may suggest a variety of 
alternative solutions to problems. Informative messages are characterized by the use of 
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neutral language, and organic or natural patterns of organization. 
Persuasive 
 Persuasive strategies are characterized by appeals to audience values, or affect 
and a biased presentation of information. They may use language which is not neutral and 
reflects the importance of the issue and the involvement of the source in the situation. 
These types of messages are directive in the sense that they provide a call for action 
either tacitly or explicitly.  
Promise and Reward 
 Promise and reward strategies involve the exercise of power to obtain compliance. 
They include a directive and a contingent outcome which may be explicitly or tacitly 
linked to performance of the directive request. They imply or point out that the source of 
the message controls an outcome desired by the receiver of the message. 
Threat and Punishment 
 Threat and punishment strategies involve the exercise of power, threats and 
promises to obtain compliance. They include a directive and a contingent outcome which 
may be explicitly or tacitly linked to performance of the directive request. They imply or 
point out that the source of the message controls an outcome feared or disliked by the 
receiver of the message. 
Bargaining 
 Bargaining is characterized by an organized exchange of messages between 
communicators. Strategic withholding of information and deceptions designed to mislead 
others concerning your acceptable range of alternatives and to discover the other party’s 
acceptable range of alternatives are used. Bargaining communication is characterized by 
33 
 
the use of contrasting symbols which differentiate groups, such as “we” and “they”. 
Cooperative Problem Solving 
 Cooperative problem solving messages reflect a willingness to jointly define 
problems and solutions to problems. Cooperative problem solving messages are 
characterized by the use of inclusive symbols, “we” and not “they.” In contrast to 
bargaining, problem solving is characterized by an open exchange of information. 
Situational Theory of Publics 
Using the concept of ‘publics’ derived from classic public opinion theorists 
Dewey and Blumer, Grunig “formalized those theories and provided means for 
identifying and measuring publics and their opinions” (Grunig, 1997, p. 9). Dewey and 
Blumer concluded that “publics arise around issues or problems that affect them.” After 
they recognize that a problem affects them, “publics organize into issue groups to 
pressure organizations that cause the problems or to pressure government to constrain or 
regulate those organizations” (p. 9). Grunig and Hunt (1984) describe a public as a 
loosely structured system whose members, existing with a population or linkage, detect a 
problem and behave as though they were one body to solve the problem. 
According to Grunig and Hunt (1984), the situational theory of publics “states 
that communication behaviors of publics can be best understood by measuring how 
members of publics perceive situations in which they are affected by such organizational 
consequences” (Hamilton, 1992, p. 124). In essence it describes different aspects of 
communication effects on publics. Grunig (1997) noted that publics begin as 
disconnected systems of individuals experiencing common problems; but they can evolve 
into organized and powerful activist groups” (p. 9). 
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“The situational theory provides a means of segmenting a general population into 
groups relevant to public relations practitioners” (Grunig, 1997, p. 8). This is an 
important concept when it comes to creating public relations campaigns. The foundation 
of the theory rests on the balance of trying to “predict the differential responses most 
important to public relations professionals: responsiveness to issues; amount of and 
nature of communication behavior: effects of communication on cognitions, attitudes, 
and behaviors; and the likelihood of participation in collective behavior to pressure 
organizations” (Grunig, 1997, p. 9). Vasquez (1993) adds that “publics are recognizable 
based on their shared behaviors, and the communication behavior publics can be 
understood by measuring how members of a public perceive situations in which they are 
affected by organizational consequences” (p. 208).  
Aldoory (2001) stated that “the situational theory of publics is one of the most 
useful theories for understanding why publics communicate and when they are most 
likely to communicate.” She points out that there is a significant gap in our understanding 
of the situational theory regarding any antecedent factors that may help explain 
involvement, constraint recognition, and problem recognition, the three independent 
variables in the theory. Most research has studied the dependent variables and the 
predictability of the independent variables, and most research has found strong support 
for the theory. 
Hallahan (1999) defined a public as a group of people who relate to an 
organization, who demonstrate varying degrees of activity or passivity and who might or 
might not interact with others concerning their relationship. 
 An active public is described as one who seeks information. Hamilton (1992) 
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citing Grunig (1989) characterized active publics. These “people communicating actively 
develop more organized cognitions, are more likely to have attitudes about a situation, 
and more often engage in a behavior to something about the situation” (p. 124). A passive 
public is the opposite of an active public.  They make little to no effort to seek 
information. 
The situational theory of publics consists of three independent variables and two 
dependent variables. The two dependent variables consist of active and passive publics. 
They have also been described by their characteristics as information-seeking and 
information processing. Clarke and Kline (1974) described the two dependent variables 
as premeditated information seeking, “the planned scanning of the environment for 
messages about specified topic.” Information processing “describes message discovery 
the unplanned discovery of a message followed by continued processing of it.” 
The theory is comprised of three independent variables; problem recognition, 
constraint recognition and level of involvement. “The three concepts together predict not 
only when people will communicate; they also predict that active communication 
behavior more often results in effects of communication -- cognitions, attitudes, 
individual and collective behaviors --than does passive communication behavior” 
(Grunig & Repper, 1992, p. 136). Grunig (1997) describes the independent variables as 
situational. “They describe perceptions that people have of specific situations, especially 
situations that are problematic or that produce conflicts or issues” (p.10). 
Problem Recognition 
Problem recognition stated in Aldoory (2001) is the extent to which individuals 
recognize that issues or events are problems to be concerned about” (p. 165). Major 
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(1993) found that the likelihood of communication is increased by problem recognition, 
such that, among people who face problems, information seeking and processing are 
likely to occur even under low involvement situations. Hamilton (1992) found that 
problem recognition did not account for active media use and that other variables played 
a role.” Citing Major (1993), Aldoory and Sha (2007) found that the likelihood of 
communication is increased by problem recognition, such that among people facing 
problems, information seeking and processing are likely to occur even under low 
involvement situations. 
Constraint Recognition 
The second independent variable is constraint recognition. “People do not 
communicate about problems or issues about which they believe they can do little or 
about behaviors they do not believe they have the personal efficacy to execute” (Grunig 
and Repper, 1992, p. 135). Constraint recognition represents the extent to which 
individuals perceive obstacles, or barriers, in a situation that limit their freedom to plan 
their own behavior (Werder, 2005, p. 226). Citing Grunig and Ipes (1983), Aldoory and 
Sha (2007) concluded, “for a campaign to move people to develop organized cognitions 
and perhaps to change their behavior, it must show people how they can remove 
constraints to their personally doing anything about the problem. 
Level of Involvement 
Level of involvement is the extent to which an issue, problem, or situation has 
personal relevance to an individual (Werder, 2005, p. 226). Pavik (1988) defines it as “a 
perceived emotional connection or relevance, involvement increases the likelihood of 
individuals attending to and comprehending messages.” This creates an active audience. 
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These high-involved publics often seek additional information to supplement their 
beliefs. Lovelock and Weinberg (1984) stated that level of involvement is the degree of 
importance or concern that a product or behavior generates in different individuals. 
 Research on involvement and other independent variables has led to a greater 
understanding of the probability of information seeking and information processing. 
These studies and others have shown that, in general, members of a public are more 
likely to seek information and communicate actively when they perceive an issue to be a 
problem. People communicating actively develop more organized cognitions, are more 
likely to have attitudes about a situation and more often engage in a behavior to do 
something about the situation. An active public often seeks information through a variety 
of media, interpersonal contacts, and specialized channels. Passive publics are more 
likely to process information from mass media (Aldoory, 2007). 
 The situational theory of publics has been extended over the years by researchers 
testing different situations on the independent variables. Personal and impersonal 
dimensions of the independent variables have been created and tested. They argued that 
independent variables, such as level of involvement, were driven by either egoistic 
concerns or altruistic concerns. Results of these studies indicated that distinguishing 
situations by personal and impersonal dimensions usefully extended the situational theory 
because of the dimensions’ improvement in segmenting publics. Goal compatibility is the 
extent to which goals or objectives of one party are similar to and coincide with the goals 
and objectives of another party (Page & Hazleton, 1999). 
 Hazleton’s (1993) public relations strategies will be the foundation for my 
message treatments. These strategies are typically used by organizations to communicate 
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a message. Current research does not measure these strategies in a risk communication 
context. This study will help better understand the type of message strategies that are 
most effective when the public is at risk. Messages for my treatments will be derived 
directly from the definitions of the strategy types indentified by Hazleton.  
 Grunig’s situational theory of publics will help identify the effects of these 
message strategies on the public. By understanding how the public responds to problem 
recognition, constraint recognition and level of involvement will allow experts in the risk 
communication field to better craft messages to garner the necessary/desired response 
from the public. In risk communications, reaching your target audience is critical. By 
understanding message strategies and the variables identified in the situational theory of 
publics, organizations will be able to reach their target publics and yield the desired 
outcomes. 
 The purpose of this study is to understand what message source and strategy type 
is most effective in emergency management communications. Below are the hypotheses 
and propositions this study seeks to test. 
H1: In emergency communication, message source will influence receiver variables. 
P1.1: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher problem recognition 
than a local message source (HCG). 
P1.2: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher constraint 
recognition than a local message source (HCG). 
P1.3: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher level of involvement 
than a local message source (HCG). 
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P1.4: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher expertise than a local 
message source (HCG). 
P1.5: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher trust than a local 
message source (HCG). 
P1.6: A national message source (NWS) will produce more positive attitudes than 
a local message source (HCG). 
P1.7: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher information-seeking 
than a local message source (HCG). 
H2: In emergency communication, message strategy will influence receiver variables. 
P2.1: Information seeking will be the highest when the threat and punishment 
strategy is used. 
P2.2: Information seeking will be the lowest when the informative strategy is 
used. 
H3: Level of involvement will produce the strongest effect on information seeking 
behavior. 
H4: Constraint recognition will produce the weakest effect on information seeking 
behavior.  
The next chapter explains the methodology used in this study. The experimental 
procedures, the treatment conditions, the instrumentation, and the data analysis 
procedures are included. 
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Chapter Four 
Methodology 
The purpose of this study is to understand what strategy type and message source 
is most effective in emergency management communications. Below are the hypotheses 
and propositions this study tests: 
H1: In emergency communication, message source will influence receiver variables. 
P1.1: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher problem recognition 
than a local message source (HCG). 
P1.2: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher constraint 
recognition than a local message source (HCG). 
P1.3: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher level of involvement 
than a local message source (HCG). 
P1.4: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher expertise than a local 
message source (HCG). 
P1.5: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher trust than a local 
message source (HCG). 
P1.6: A national message source (NWS) will produce more positive attitudes than 
a local message source (HCG). 
P1.7: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher information-seeking 
than a local message source (HCG). 
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H2: In emergency communication, message strategy will influence receiver variables. 
P2.1: Information seeking will be the highest when the threat and punishment 
strategy is used. 
P2.2: Information seeking will be the lowest when the informative strategy is 
used. 
H3: Level of involvement will produce the strongest effect on information seeking 
behavior. 
H4: Constraint recognition will produce the weakest effect on information seeking 
behavior.  
Methodology 
 A controlled experiment was conducted to test the four hypotheses and nine 
propositions posited by this study. Werder (2005) designed an experiment to test the 
effect of Hazleton’s public relations strategies on the receiver variables of problem 
recognition, constraint recognition, and level of involvement. This study seeks to 
replicate and extend that study in the context of emergency communication.  
Research Participants 
 Research participants were recruited from five undergraduate classes at a large 
southeastern public university: Principles of Public Relations; Introduction to 
Advertising; Mass Communications and Society; Public Relations Research; and 
Marketing Management.  The sample consisted of a total of 147 participants. The 
participants included 96 females and 51 males. The age range of students who 
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participated in this study was 18 to 44. The average age was 22. Those who volunteered 
to participate in the study did not receive any incentive.  
Stimulus Materials 
 Using a 2 x 6 factorial design, 12 treatment conditions and two control treatments 
were created. Each participant in the survey was randomly assigned one of twelve 
different treatment conditions or one of two control conditions. A minimum of 10 
questionnaires were completed for each treatment and control condition. A total of 147 
questionnaires were completed. These treatments varied by message source and strategy 
type. Six of the treatment conditions created were from the National Weather Service and 
six were from the Hillsborough County Government.  
 The six message types were derived from Hazleton’s (1993) public relations 
message strategies: informative, facilitative, persuasive, promise and reward, threat and 
punishment and cooperative problem solving. The message treatments were in the form 
of hurricane press advisories with information coming directly from past hurricane 
releases. Each of the press advisories for all 12 treatments was almost identical. The 
content was identical in all 12 treatments. The format was replicated from an official 
hurricane advisory sent out to the media/public during a hurricane. The name of the 
hurricane, Jacob, was chosen. The name of the storm is not related to any previous 
hurricane that had hit Florida.  
 The information in the press advisory was changed to simulate a category three 
hurricane approaching Tampa Bay. Cities/locations in the advisory were changed to make 
the simulation as real as possible. The only changes that were made to distinguish the 
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differences between the two message sources were the headline, logo and sidebar. The 
headline read, “Hillsborough County Government Hurricane Advisory” and “National 
Weather Service Hurricane Advisory.”  
 The logos of both these organizations were placed above the sidebar in the same 
location and of the same size. The manipulations used to test message strategy were 
placed in the sidebar. The sidebar was offset from the rest of the material in a gray-
shaded box. The boxes on all the treatments were the same size. The manipulations 
ranged between 13 and 17 lines of text. The word count ranged from 36 to 50. The 
control messages were unrelated to the issue featured in the treatment materials. They 
consisted of a press release about a new hiring at the National Weather Service Office in 
Wisconsin and a hurricane preparedness convention in Tampa. An identical survey 
followed all 12 treatments and the control condition.  
Instrumentation 
 The questionnaire consisted of the variables identified in Grunig’s situational 
theory of publics. Twenty-six items were created to measure problem recognition, 
constraint recognition, level of involvement and information-seeking behavior. 
Responses to were rated on a 7-point Semantic-differential scale. Participants were asked 
to rate the indicated statements, 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (somewhat 
disagree), 4 (neutral/no opinion), 5 (somewhat agree), 6 (agree), and 7 (strongly agree) 
on a continuum. 
 Each variable was tested by the following statements. Problem recognition was 
measured by the subsequent statements: 1) Based on the weather advisory I read, I 
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believe this situation qualifies as an emergency; 2) I recognize the existence of a weather-
related emergency situation; 3) I don’t believe this emergency situation is serious; 4) I 
want to understand this emergency situation better; 5) I need to seek out additional 
information to better understand this emergency situation.  
Constraint recognition was measured by these statements: 1) I believe that I am 
not able to evacuate; 2) I cannot do anything about this emergency situation; 3) I believe 
that there are constraints or obstacles that limit my ability to evacuate; 4) I do not 
understand this evacuation enough to do anything about it; 5) I do not understand this 
emergency situation enough to do anything about it; 6) I do not have the ability to make a 
difference in the outcome of this emergency situation.  
Level of involvement was measured by the following statements: 1) I am 
personally affected by this emergency situation; 2) I have strong opinions about this 
emergency situation; 3) I have strong opinions about evacuation; 4) I am personally 
affected by this evacuation; 5) This evacuation does not involve me; 6) This emergency 
situation does not involve me.  
Three statements were used to measure information-seeking behavior: 1) I will 
actively seek more information about this emergency situation; 2) I plan to seek out 
additional information on ways I can better prepare for this emergency situation; 3) I 
don’t want any more information about this emergency situation. 
In addition, trust and expertise were measured by using three statements each. 
These questions changed if someone received a National Weather Service treatment or a 
local government treatment. Trust was measured on the National Weather Service 
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questionnaire by the following items: 1) I trust information provided by the National 
Weather Service; 2) The National Weather Service is a trustworthy organization; 3) The 
National Weather Service is a credible organization. Expertise was measured by: 1) The 
National Weather Service has adequate expertise to handle this emergency situation; 2) 
The National Weather Service provides the most accurate information about emergency 
situations; 3) The National Weather Service is knowledgeable about emergency 
preparedness.  
Trust was measured on the local government questionnaire by the following 
statements: 1) I trust information provided by the local government; 2) The local 
government is a trustworthy organization; 3) The local government is a credible 
organization. Expertise was measured by: 1) The local government has adequate 
expertise to handle this emergency situation; 2) The local government provides the most 
accurate information about emergency situations; 3) My local government is 
knowledgeable about emergency preparedness. 
Attitudes toward the National Weather Service and the Hillsborough County 
Government were measured by a semantic-differential scale. The terms measured 
consisted of bad : good, negative : positive, incompetent : competent, and not important : 
important.  
 The last section of the questionnaire asked participants to provide demographic 
information. This included gender, age, ethnicity, type of dwelling, highest level of 
education completed, registered voter, and number of children they have. 
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A pretest was conducted to determine the validity of the message treatments used 
in this study. This manipulation check was performed to assess the degree to which the 
weather emergency situation message treatments agreed with Hazleton’s (1993) public 
relations strategy definitions. An expert panel, consisting of 7 graduate students agreed 
that the treatments reflected the definition.  
Data analysis was conducted using SPSS 15.0 for Windows. An alpha level of .05 
was required for significance in all statistical procedures, which included reliability 
analysis, correlation analysis, linear regression analysis and analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Due to the sampling procedure used, not all treatments had the same number 
of responses. The next chapter presents the results from the study. 
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Chapter Five 
Results 
The purpose of this study is to understand what message source and strategy type 
is most effective in emergency management communications. This study tested the 
following hypotheses and propositions: 
H1: In emergency communication, message source will influence receiver variables. 
P1.1: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher problem recognition 
than a local message source (HCG). 
P1.2: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher constraint 
recognition than a local message source (HCG). 
P1.3: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher level of involvement 
than a local message source (HCG). 
P1.4: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher expertise than a local 
message source (HCG). 
P1.5: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher trust than a local 
message source (HCG). 
P1.6: A national message source (NWS) will produce more positive attitudes than 
a local message source (HCG). 
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P1.7: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher information-seeking 
than a local message source (HCG). 
H2: In emergency communication, message strategy will influence receiver variables. 
P2.1: Information seeking will be the highest when the threat and punishment 
strategy is used. 
P2.2: Information seeking will be the lowest when the informative strategy is 
used. 
H3: Level of involvement will produce the strongest effect on information seeking 
behavior. 
H4: Constraint recognition will produce the weakest effect on information seeking 
behavior.  
Descriptives 
Descriptive statistics were conducted to find out information about the 
participants. Of the 147 participants in the study, 34.7% (n = 51) were male and 65.3% (n 
= 96) were females. All percentages reflect the valid sample. Table 3 shows the 
participants race identification.  
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Table 3: Participants Race Identification 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Caucasian 100 68.0 68.5 68.5
Hispanic 15 10.2 10.3 78.8
African-American 14 9.5 9.6 88.4
Asian 5 3.4 3.4 91.8
American Indian 1 .7 .7 92.5
Pacific Islander 2 1.4 1.4 93.8
Other 9 6.1 6.2 100.0
Total 146 99.3 100.0  
Missing 99 1 .7   
 Total 147 100.0   
 
Participants identified themselves as Caucasian 68.5% (n = 100). The highest 
level of education completed was ‘some college’ at 92.5% (n = 135). The type of 
dwelling was either ‘house’ 42.6% (n = 58) and ‘apartment’ 52.9% (n = 72). Those who 
surveyed did not have any children 97.1% (n = 132). Most people surveyed were 
registered voters at 92.6% (n = 126). When asked if they would need to assist an elderly 
family member during an evacuation, 39.7% (n = 54) indicated yes and 60.3% (n = 82) 
indicated no. The mean age of the participants was 21.86. The ages ranged from 18 to 44. 
Data analysis began with an examination of descriptive statistics for all items used 
to measure the receiver variables of problem recognition, constraint recognition, level of 
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involvement, expertise, trust, attitude, and information seeking behavior. The item means 
and standard deviations are shown in Table 4. Item means ranged from 2.65 to 6.12. The 
item “I believe that I am not able to evacuate,” which measured constraint recognition, 
produced the lowest mean of 2.65. The item “I recognize the existence of a weather 
related emergency situation,” which measured problem recognition, produced the highest 
mean of 6.12. 
For problem recognition, the item “I recognize the existence of a weather-related 
emergency situation” produced the highest mean (M = 6.12, SD = 1.101). “I need to seek 
out additional information to better understand this emergency situation” produced the 
lowest mean (M = 4.71, SD = 1.640). 
Constraint recognition is reversed when looking at the mean. The item “I believe 
that I am not able to evacuate” produced the highest mean (M = 2.65, SD = 1.488) and the 
item “I believe that there are constraints or obstacles that limit my ability to evacuate 
produced the lowest mean (M = 3.85, SD = 1.650). 
For level of involvement, the item “This emergency situation does not involve me 
had the highest mean (M = 5.55, SD = 1.540). “I have strong opinions about this 
emergency situation” produced the lowest mean (M = 4.02, SD = 1.474). 
The source in the items used to measure expertise and trust were changed to 
match the different treatment conditions. The source was the National Weather Service 
and the Hillsborough County Government in the different treatment conditions. 
“The source is knowledgeable about emergency preparedness” produced the 
highest mean under expertise of the source, (M = 5.26, SD = 1.339). “Expertise of the 
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source provides the most accurate information about emergency situations” produced the 
lowest mean (M = 4.45, SD = 1.350). 
For trust of the source, “The source is a credible organization” produced the 
highest mean (M = 4.92, SD = 1.405). “The source is a trustworthy organization’ 
generated the lowest mean (M = 4.81, SD = 1.577). 
An “important” attitude toward the source produced the highest mean (M = 5.72, 
SD = 1.213). A “positive” attitude toward the source produced the lowest mean (M = 
5.08, SD = 1.243) 
For information seeking behavior, the statement “I don’t want any more 
information about this emergency situation” had the highest mean (M = 5.70, SD = 
1.655). “I will actively seek more information about this emergency situation” produced 
the lowest mean (M = 4.71, SD = 1.703). 
 
Table 4: Item Mean and Standard Deviation 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
1 PR Based on the advisory I 
read, I believe this situation 
qualifies as an emergency. 
146 1 7 5.47 1.405
2 PR I want to understand 
this emergency situation 
better. 
145 1 7 4.83 1.692
13 PR I recognize the 
existence of a weather-
related emergency situation. 
146 1 7 6.12 1.101
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 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
14 PR I need to seek out 
additional information to 
better understand this 
emergency situation. 
146 1 7 4.71 1.640
21 PR REV I don't believe 
this emergency situation is 
serious. 
146 1 7 5.51 1.496
3 CR I cannot do anything 
about this emergency 
situation. 
146 1 7 3.57 1.922
4 CR I do not have the ability 
to make a difference in the 
outcome of this emergency 
situation. 
146 1 7 3.66 1.884
7 CR I do not understand this 
evacuation enough to do 
anything about it. 
146 1 7 3.33 1.801
11 CR I do not understand 
this emergency situation 
enough to do anything about 
it. 
146 1 7 2.98 1.595
15 CR I believe that there are 
constraints or obstacles that 
limit my ability to evacuate. 
146 1 7 3.85 1.650
23 CR I believe that I am not 
able to evacuate. 
146 1 7 2.65 1.488
10 LI I am personally 
affected by this emergency 
situation. 
145 1 7 5.14 1.597
Table 4. Continued 
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 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
12 LI REV This evacuation 
does not involve me. 
146 1 7 5.14 1.772
16 LI REV This emergency 
situation does not involve 
me. 
146 1 7 5.55 1.540
17 LI I have strong opinions 
about this emergency 
situation. 
146 1 7 4.02 1.474
20 LI I am personally 
affected by this evacuation. 
145 1 7 4.74 1.625
26 LI I have strong opinions 
about evacuation. 
146 1 7 4.05 1.379
6 EXP The SOURCE has 
adequate expertise to handle 
this emergency situation. 
147 1 7 4.71 1.424
9 EXP The SOURCE is 
knowledgeable about 
emergency preparedness. 
146 1 7 5.26 1.339
18 EXP The SOURCE 
provides the most accurate 
information about emergency 
situations. 
146 1 7 4.45 1.350
8 TRUST The SOURCE is a 
trustworthy organization. 
146 1 7 4.81 1.577
19 TRUST I trust 
information provided by the 
SOURCE. 
146 1 7 4.88 1.402
25 TRUST The SOURCE is 
a credible organization. 
146 1 7 4.92 1.405
Table 4. Continued 
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 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ATT GU11536902ood 146 1 7 5.25 1.166
ATT Positive 146 1 7 5.08 1.243
ATT Competent 146 1 7 5.10 1.363
ATT Important 146 1 7 5.72 1.213
5 IS REV I don't want any 
more information about this 
emergency situation. 
145 1 7 5.70 1.655
22 INFOSEEK I plan to seek 
out additional information on 
ways I can better prepare for 
this emergency situation.  
146 1 7 4.88 1.659
24 INFOSEEK I will actively 
seek more information about 
this emergency situation. 
146 1 7 4.71 1.703
Valid N (listwise) 139     
 
Prior to hypothesis testing, Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the internal 
consistency of the multiple-item indexes for problem recognition, constraint recognition, 
level of involvement, information-seeking behavior, expertise, trust and attitude. 
Reversed items were transformed before performing the reliability analysis. The results 
of the analysis are shown in Table 5 
  
Table 4. Continued 
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. Table 5: Final Cronbach’s Alpha for Multiple-Item Indexes 
Variable α Number of items 
Problem Recognition .65 4 
Constraint Recognition .66 5 
Level of Involvement .79 5 
Information Seeking-
Behavior 
.81 3 
Expertise of the Source .73 3 
Trust of the Source .90 3 
Attitude Toward the Source .87 4 
 
Five items were included to test problem recognition; however the alpha indicated 
scale reliability was higher by dropping the item “I need to seek out additional 
information to better understand this emergency situation.” The four remaining items 
produced a reliability coefficient of .65. Six items were used to test constraint 
recognition. The alpha indicated scale reliability was higher by dropping the item “I 
believe that there are constraints or obstacles that limit my ability to evacuate.” The five 
remaining items produced a reliability coefficient of .66. Six items were also used to test 
level of involvement. The alpha indicated scale reliability was higher by dropping the 
item “I have strong opinions about this emergency situation.” The five remaining items 
produced a reliability coefficient of .79. The three items used to test information-seeking 
behavior produced a reliability coefficient of .81. The three items used to test the 
expertise of the source produced a reliability coefficient of .73. The three items used to 
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measure trust of the source produced a reliability coefficient of .90. Finally, the four 
items were used to test attitude of the source and produced a reliability coefficient of .87.  
While alpha values between .80 and 1.00 indicated high reliability (Berman, 
2002), it is generally agreed that the lower limit of .70 is still a useful measure of 
constructs (Broom & Dozier, 1990; Stacks, 2002). While the situational theory of publics 
is a strong theory, a strong criticism is the weak internal reliability of the items that 
measure its constructs. 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 stated that in emergency communication, message source will 
influence receiver variables. Receiver variables are problem recognition, constraint 
recognition and level of involvement. To test this hypothesis, regression analysis was 
performed. Message source, the independent variable, was regressed on the measures of 
problem recognition, constraint recognition and level of involvement, the dependent 
variables. The results of the analysis are shown below. 
Proposition 1.1 stated that a national message source (NWS) will produce higher 
problem recognition than a local source (HCG). The local government produced a higher 
mean score (M = 5.63, SD = .94943) than the National Weather Service (M = 5.36, SD = 
1.04410). However, the results of ANOVA were not significant, F(1,143)=2.629, p=1.07. 
Therefore, P1.1 is not supported. 
Proposition 1.2 stated that a national message source (NWS) will produce higher 
constraint recognition than a local message source (HCG). While the ANOVA was not 
significant, F(1,144)=3.142, p=.078, the National Weather Service produced a higher 
57 
 
mean score (M = 3.49, SD = 1.07795) than the local government (M = 3.19, SD = 
.99157). Thus, there is mixed support for P1.2. 
Proposition 1.3 stated that a national message source (NWS) will produce a 
higher level of involvement than a local message source (HCG). The local government 
produced a higher mean score (M = 4.94, SD = 1.04625) than the National Weather 
Service (M = 4.65, SD = 1.10609); however, the ANOVA test was not significant, 
F=(1,142)=2.620, p=.108. Thus, P1.3 is not supported. 
Proposition 1.4 stated that a national message source (NWS) will produce higher 
expertise than a local message source (HCG). The results of the ANOVA test were 
significant, F(1,143) = 26.39, p =.000. The NWS produced a significantly higher mean 
score (M = 5.23, SD = .95076) over the local government source (M = 4.36, SD = 
1.07876). P1.4 was supported. 
Proposition 1.5 stated that a national message source (NWS) will produce higher 
trust than a local message source (HCG). The results were significant, F(1,142) = 44.79, 
p = .000. The NWS produced a significantly higher mean score (M = 5.51, SD = 1.05697) 
than the local government source (M = 4.21, SD = 1.27383). Thus, P1.5 was supported. 
Proposition 1.6 stated that a national message source (NWS) will produce more 
positive attitudes than a local message source (HCG). The ANOVA results were 
significant, F(1,143) = 27.14, p = .000. The NWS produced a significantly higher mean 
score (M = 5.69, SD = .88395) than the local government source (M = 4.86, SD = 
1.05531). Thus, P1.6 was supported. 
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Proposition 1.7 stated that a national message source (NWS) will produce higher 
information-seeking than a local message source (HCG). The local government source 
produced a higher mean score (M = 5.28, SD = 1.43204) than the National Weather 
Service source (M = 4.92, SD = 1.41293), and the ANOVA results were not significant, 
F(1,143)=2.297, p=.132. Thus, P1.7 is not supported. 
Hypothesis 2 
 A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to test this hypothesis. Hypothesis 
2 stated that, in emergency communication, message strategy will influence receiver 
variables. Results indicated that problem recognition was significantly affected by 
strategy type, F(6,138)=3.00, p=.001. An evaluation of mean scores indicated that the 
threat and punishment strategy produced the greatest influence on problem recognition 
(M = 5.85, SD = .76691), followed by the persuasive strategy (M = 5.69, SD = .83256) 
and the promise and reward strategy (M = 5.68, SD = 1.06646). The means for problem 
recognition across all treatments are shown in Table 6. 
In addition, results indicated that level of involvement was significantly affected 
by strategy type, F(6,137)=2.821, p=.013. An evaluation of the mean score indicated that 
the threat and punishment strategy produced the greatest influence on level of 
involvement (M = 5.23, SD = 1.8875), followed by the facilitative strategy (M = 5.03, SD 
= .78658), and the cooperative problem-solving strategy (M = 4.90, SD = 1.11252). The 
means for level of involvement across all treatments are shown in Table 6. 
The other receiver variables were not significant; however, the mean scores are 
shown in Table 6. For constraint recognition, the facilitative strategy had the highest 
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mean (M = 2.96, SD = .83875), followed by the threat and punishment strategy (M = 
3.17, SD = .94281). For expertise, the persuasive strategy produced the highest mean (M 
= 5.32, SD = 1.25230), followed by the cooperative-problem solving strategy (M = 4.98, 
SD = .89738). The persuasive strategy also had the highest mean for the trust receiver 
variable (M = 5.24, SD = 1.25230). Second was the cooperative-problem solving strategy 
type (M = 5.21, SD = 1.09279). For attitude, the persuasive strategy produced the highest 
mean (M = 5.62, SD = .86826), followed by the cooperative-problem solving strategy (M 
= 5.49, SD = .79668).  
Hypothesis 2 stated that in emergency communication, message strategy will 
influence receiver variables. Threat and punishment had the highest mean for 
information-seeking behavior (M = 5.48, SD = 1.36572), followed by promise and reward 
(M = 5.37, SD = 1.35465). Proposition 2.1 stated that information-seeking behavior will 
be the highest when the threat and punishment strategy is used. Thus, proposition 2.1 is 
supported.  
Proposition 2.2 stated that information-seeking behavior will be the lowest when 
the informative strategy is used. However, the persuasive strategy produced the lowest 
mean for information-seeking among strategies, (M = 4.80, SD = 1.698). Thus, 
proposition 2.2 is not supported. While the informative strategy did produce a low mean 
for information-seeking behavior, the persuasive strategy produced the lowest mean 
score.  
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Table 6: ANOVA Strategy Type/Receiver Variables 
Strategy Type/Receiver Variables N Mean Std. Deviation 
PR              Threat and Punishment 20 5.8500 .76691 
                   Persuasive    21 5.6905 .83256 
                   Promise and Reward 20 5.6875 1.06646 
                   Cooperative 21 5.5595 .88000 
                    Facilitative 21 5.5238 .74542 
                    Informative 24 5.4896 1.11920 
                    Control 18 4.5139 1.12613 
                    Total 145 5.4897 1.00384 
    
CR                Facilitative 21 2.9683 .83934 
                     Threat and Punishment 20 3.1667 .94281 
                     Persuasive 21 3.2222 .96944 
                     Promise and Reward 20 3.3000 .83875 
                     Informative 24 3.4028 1.00111 
                     Cooperative 21 3.5317 1.34125 
                     Control 19 3.8070 1.21241 
                     Total 146 3.3390 1.04210 
    
LI                 Threat and Punishment 20 5.2333 1.08875 
                     Facilitative 20 5.0333 .78658 
                     Cooperative 21 4.9048 1.11252 
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                     Promise and Reward 20 4.8333 1.21876 
                     Persuasive 21 4.8016 1.06278 
                     Informative 23 4.7319 .98311 
                     Control 19 3.9649 1.00551 
                     Total 144 4.7917 1.08309 
    
EXPERT      Persuasive 21 5.3175 .85943 
                     Cooperative 21 4.9841 .89738 
                     Promise and Reward 20 4.7667 .96791 
                     Informative 23 4.7536 1.27215 
                     Threat and Punishment 20 4.7167 1.14593 
                     Facilitative 21 4.5238 1.04654 
                     Control 19 4.4912 1.37153 
                     Total 145 4.7977 1.10225 
    
TRUST          Persuasive 21 5.2381 1.25230 
                      Cooperative 21 5.2063 1.09279 
                      Threat and Punishment 20 4.9000 1.25237 
                      Facilitative 21 4.8413 1.19545 
                      Informative 22 4.7727 1.33090 
                      Promise and Reward 20 4.6500 1.63469 
                      Control 19 4.3684 1.54718 
                      Total 144 4.8611 1.33770 
    
ATT               Persuasive 21 5.6190 .86826 
Table 6. Continued 
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                      Cooperative 20 5.4875 .79668 
                      Informative 24 5.4063 .96631 
                      Facilitative 21 5.2857 1.17070 
                      Promise and Reward 20 5.2375 1.02108 
                      Threat and Punishment 20 5.1500 1.09545 
                      Control 20 4.7750 1.33007 
                      Total 146 5.2860 1.05495 
    
INFOSEEK  Threat and Punishment 20 5.4833 1.36572 
                      Promise and Reward 20 5.3667 1.35465 
                      Cooperative 21 5.2857 1.37148 
                      Facilitative 21 5.1429 1.20909 
                      Informative 24 5.1111 1.67004 
                      Persuasive 20 4.8000 1.69761 
                      Control 19 4.4211 1.11023 
                      Total 145 5.0943 1.42871 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 stated that level of involvement will produce the strongest effect on 
information-seeking behavior. Linear regression analysis was conducted to test this 
hypothesis. For the analysis, problem recognition, constraint recognition, and level of 
involvement were the independent variables and information-seeking behavior was the 
dependent variable. Results indicated that the three independent variables, together 
contributed to 32% of the variance in information-seeking, R = .572, R² = .327, 
Table 6. Continued 
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F(3,138)=22.34, p=.000. However, an examination of the coefficient analysis, shown in 
Table 7, indicated that problem recognition produced the strongest effect on information-
seeking behavior. Therefore, H3 was not supported.  
Hypothesis 4 
In addition, Hypothesis 4 stated that constraint recognition will produce the 
weakest effect on information-seeking behavior. The results shown in Table 7 indicate 
that H4 is supported. 
                                                               Table 7: Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients  
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) .193 .750  .258 .797
LI .393 .122 .308 3.224 .002
PR .485 .125 .351 3.885 .000
CR .121 .102 .089 1.179 .241
a. Dependent Variable: INFOSEEK 
 
The next chapter provides a discussion of the results and draws conclusions about 
the findings of this study. It also includes limitations of the study, future research, and 
conclusions. 
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Chapter Six 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study is to understand what message source and strategy type 
is most effective in emergency management communications. Results indicated that a 
national message source produced higher constraint recognition. The national message 
source produced higher expertise, trust, and attitude then a local message source. The 
threat and punishment strategy produced the highest level of information-seeking 
behavior. Information-seeking behavior was the lowest when a persuasive strategy was 
used. Constraint recognition produced the weakest effect on information-seeking 
behavior. 
This study examined Hazleton’s (1993) public relations strategies. Specifically, 
message strategy effects were examined using J.E. Grunig’s (1997) situational theory of 
publics to determine strategy influence on individuals’ problem recognition, constraint 
recognition, level of involvement, information seeking behavior, expertise, trust and 
attitude toward the source of emergency communication. Four hypotheses were tested.  
Hypothesis 1: In emergency communication, message source will influence receiver 
variables. 
P1.1: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher problem recognition 
than a local message source (HCG). This proposition was not supported. Respondents 
indicated that they are most likely to recognize the existence of a problem if it is 
communicated at the local level. This makes sense because local officials have a better 
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understanding of the local environment and the potential effects of an emergency 
situation. The local source plays a significant factor in whether publics will be active or 
passive. Local officials are a prominent factor in disseminating emergency information to 
the public. They are better educated on the perceived risks and how to minimize the 
effects of the emergency. 
P1.2: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher constraint 
recognition than a local message source (HCG). This proposition produced mixed 
support. “Constraint recognition represents the extent to which individuals perceive 
obstacles or barriers, in a situation that limit their freedom to plan their own behavior” 
(Werder, 2005, p.226). This is important because it states that national messages that are 
not localized for a public can lead to the public feeling constraints on what actions they 
should take during an emergency situation. Local officials must communicate this 
information for the public to feel that they can do something in the emergency situation 
and not feel constrained.  
P1.3: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher level of involvement 
then a local message source (HCG). This proposition was not supported. This means that 
publics are more likely to be more involved in the emergency situation if they message 
source is from local officials. “An emotional connection of relevance increases the 
likelihood of individuals attending to and comprehending messages” (Pavik 1988). The 
public perceives themselves to be more involved in an emergency situation when the 
information is communicated at a local level. Local communicators understand the geo-
spatial map of the area and can best make decisions to help the public from a risk. Once 
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the public understands the existence of an emergency situation, having a local official 
conveying the message will make the public more active. 
The local officials have a significant role in emergency communication. The local 
source creates higher problem recognition, produces lower constraint recognition and a 
higher level of involvement. These three items help shape the role local officials have 
when communicating emergency messages. Not only must they be knowledgeable on the 
local effects of the emergency, they must shape public opinion to get the public to act in a 
certain manner that is most beneficial to the community. The next three propositions 
yielded significant results on the attributes of the message source.  
P1.4: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher expertise then a local 
message source (HCG). This proposition was supported with significance. The national 
message source yielded a higher level of expertise then the local source. In emergency 
communication, especially with the hurricane situation used in our treatments, people 
believe that there is a higher level of expertise at the national level. This makes sense 
because the National Hurricane Center makes predictions about these storms using 
sophisticated resources. Local officials often communicate that they are waiting for 
updated hurricane information from the National Hurricane Center via their scheduled 
advisories. This may have engrained the public to view the national message source as 
having more expertise. The local officials must take that information and shape messages 
to reach their publics. For local officials, it may be best to communicate the source of the 
message as from a national source to establish the expertise of the message. 
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P1.5: A national message source (NWS) will produce higher trust than a local 
message source (HCG). This proposition was supported with significance. This was an 
interesting discovery about the trust of local officials in emergency situations. Results 
indicated that the public has higher trust in a national message source then a local 
message source. This may reflect back to the argument that the public is used to hearing 
that they are waiting on information from the National Hurricane Center. Local officials 
seem to communicate the trust in the national message source in terms of their 
communication strategy. Communicators need to factor the trustworthiness of the 
national message source into their messages to become more credible. When 
communicating an emergency situation, having interviews and live updates from a 
national source may be a resourceful way to build trust in local officials. This shows the 
communication with the national source and having them share their expertise to make 
the best local emergency decisions.  
P1.6: A national message source (NWS) will produce more positive attitudes than 
a local message source (HCG). This proposition was supported with significance. The 
attitudes tested were bad : good, negative : positive, incompetent : competent, and not 
important : important. The attitude ‘important’ produced the highest mean score. 
‘Positive’ and ‘Competent’ yielded the lowest means. This finding confirms the expertise 
and trust of the message source. The public views the national message source as being 
more important, positive, competent, and good. The local message source must 
communicate the message as being from a national message source to have the message 
be perceived by the attitudes tested in this study. 
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P1.7: A national message source (NWS) will produce increases information-
seeking than a local message source (HCG). This proposition was not supported. This 
means the public looks toward the local message source to provide specific information 
on what actions they should take. The public needs to understand the local risks involved 
with the emergency and how best to protect themselves. While the national message 
source may produce higher expertise, trust, and attitude, the local component is still an 
important factor in the public’s actions to seek out additional information. 
Hypothesis 2: In emergency communication, message strategy will influence receiver 
variables. 
P2.1: Information-seeking will be the highest when the threat and punishment 
strategy is used. This proposition was supported. This correlates directly with my 
introduction situation with Hurricane Ike. Residents reacted toward evacuation orders at 
unprecedented levels when certain death language was used regarding the intense nature 
of the hurricane. This indicates that when communicating emergency information, it may 
be best to communicate the ‘worst possible outcome’ as the message. Fear tactics, since 
2001, seem to have a greater effect on the public’s actions toward an emergency 
situation. In addition, it makes the public want to seek out additional information on the 
emergency situation because the severity of it is the message. 
When communicating to the public about emergency situations, the threat and 
punishment strategy generated the highest information-seeking behavior. Communicators 
can’t use ‘certain death’ language every time a hurricane approaches the United States 
and expect to get the same reaction each time. The punishment aspect of the message is 
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critical. By saying that emergency response personnel are not going to risk their own 
lives to rescue you because you failed to listen to emergency evacuation messages sets a 
precedent that if you disobey mandatory evacuation messages that you will be dealt to 
deal with the consequences.  
P2.2: Information-seeking will be the lowest when the informative strategy is 
used. This proposition was not supported. Information-seeking was the lowest when the 
persuasive strategy was used. This means that the public doesn’t want to be told how to 
act during emergency situations. They want to make their own decisions on how best to 
deal with the situation by using the information they have. This is an important finding 
because it indicates the type of message that should not be used when communicating 
emergency communication. 
Hypothesis 3: Level of involvement will produce the strongest effect on information 
seeking behavior. 
This hypothesis was not supported; however the results were significant. This 
means that level of involvement does play a significant role in information-seeking 
behavior. The more a person is involved in the emergency situation means that they will 
seek out additional information. It is important to target the public that has the greatest 
potential of being affected by the emergency situation because it will allow them to seek 
out additional information on how to respond. Level of involvement and problem 
recognition are vital to information-seeking behavior. If communicators target these 
publics with the correct message type, the desired response indicated by national and 
local officials will be executed. 
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Hypothesis 4: Constraint recognition will produce the weakest effect on information 
seeking behavior.  
This hypothesis was supported. Constraint recognition produced the weakest 
effect on information-seeking behavior. A public that feels constrained during an 
emergency situation is most likely to become passive about the situation because they 
feel that they cannot do anything to prevent it. These individuals see obstacles and 
barriers in the emergency situation that prohibits them from seeking additional 
information or taking action.   
Limitations 
The results are limited to the demographic surveyed. They are not generalizable to 
a greater population. The source of the message may not make a difference in how risk 
communication messages are received. The use of ‘emergency’ is also a limitation 
because that definition varies among people. A hypothetical situation was used which 
may not be reality. It is tough to argue how people in Tampa Bay would act to a direct hit 
by a hurricane because the area hasn’t been hit by a hurricane directly since the early 
1900s.  
In addition, the population surveyed was college undergraduate students who 
don’t own their own dwelling. There ‘life’ as a college student may not depict the typical 
lives of those living in the Tampa Bay area that may deal with this type of emergency 
situation. Traditionally, college-students are not known to be an information-seeking 
public. Students were surveyed during the beginning of hurricane season. The season 
doesn’t usually increase in activity until August and September. If this survey was 
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conducted during a period of higher activity, hurricane communication may have been 
more recent in their minds.  
In conclusion, this study discovered the type of message source and message type 
that is best to use in emergency communication. This study extends the situational theory 
of publics to emergency communication. Future research would need to experiment with 
other types of emergency situations. Hurricanes are only a major concern for part of the 
country. Extending this study to other emergency situations could further validate the 
results of this study. The variables tested also provide communicators with structure on 
how to communicate these messages to the public. Emergency communication is critical. 
By understanding how a public responds to these messages is vital to getting the message 
out to its intended publics. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaires 
       
 
Informed Consent to Participate in Research 
Protocol Title: Risk Communication 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study. 
My name is Andrew Gallo. I am a graduate student here at the University of South Florida. Thank 
you for taking time to participate in this study. Your participation is completely voluntary. There 
is no penalty for not participating.  
The purpose of this study is to get students to evaluate various messages. If you choose to 
participate, you will be asked to view several messages presented in the form of advisories. You 
will then be asked to answer a set of questions regarding the advisories. It will take about 15 
minutes to complete the entire questionnaire. You can stop at any time without penalty and you 
do not have to answer any question you do not wish to answer. 
All answers are confidential to the extent provided by law. There are no known risks associated 
with this study and there are no direct benefits to you for participation. No compensation will be 
provided for your participation. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Please read the following page and answer the questions. 
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Instructions: The majority of this questionnaire makes use of rating scales with seven 
places. Some of the questions may appear to be similar, but they do address somewhat 
different issues. Please read each question carefully, be sure to answer all items. Answer 
the questions to the best of your ability. 
Section I: Please answer the questions using the scale below. Please write the 
number that corresponds to your choice in the space preceding the question. 
 
1) Based on the weather advisory I read, I believe this situation qualifies as an 
emergency. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
2) I want to understand this emergency situation better. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
3) I cannot do anything about this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
4) I do not have the ability to make a difference in the outcome of this emergency 
situation.  
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
5) I don’t want any more information about this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
6) The local government has adequate expertise to handle this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
7) I do not understand this evacuation enough to do anything about it. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
8) The local government is a trustworthy organization. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
9) The local government is knowledgeable about emergency preparedness. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
10) I am personally affected by this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
11) I do not understand this emergency situation enough to do anything about it. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
12) This evacuation does not involve me. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
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13)  I recognize the existence of a weather-related emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
14) I need to seek out additional information to better understand this emergency 
situation.  
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
15) I believe that there are constraints or obstacles that limit my ability to evacuate. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
16) This emergency situation does not involve me. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
17) I have strong opinions about this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
18) The local government provides the most accurate information about emergency 
situations. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
19) I trust information provided by the local government. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
20) I am personally affected by this evacuation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
21) I don’t believe this emergency situation is serious. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
22) I plan to seek out additional information on ways I can better prepare for this 
emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
23) I believe that I am not able to evacuate. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
24) I will actively seek more information about this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
25) The local government is a credible organization. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
26) I have strong opinions about evacuation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
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Section II: Please answer the next set of questions to the best of your ability. 
 
Please place an ‘X’ on the line that best corresponds with your attitude toward the 
local government in this emergency situation. 
Bad ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Good 
Negative ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Positive 
 Incompetent ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Competent 
Not important ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Important 
 
 
 
Section III: Please answer the next set of questions that best applies to you. 
 
Sex: ______ Male     _____  Female 
 
Age: ______ 
 
Race: 
_____ Caucasian     
_____ Hispanic      
_____ African-American  
_____ Asian         
_____ American Indian      
_____ Pacific Islander    
_____ Other 
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Highest level of education you have completed: 
 
______ High School Graduate 
______ Some college 
______ Trade/technical/vocational training 
______ College Graduate 
______ Some postgraduate work 
______ Post graduate degree 
 
Type of dwelling: 
 
______ House 
______ Condo 
______ Townhouse 
______ Apartment 
______ Mobile home 
______ Other 
 
Do you have children? 
 
______ Yes     _____ No 
 
Are you a registered voter? 
 
______ Yes     _____ No 
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Do you have an elderly relative that would need your assistance in the case of an 
emergency? 
 
______ Yes     _____ No 
 
Thank you for your time. Have a great day.  
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Informed Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Protocol Title: Risk Communication 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study. 
My name is Andrew Gallo. I am a graduate student here at the University of South Florida. Thank 
you for taking time to participate in this study. Your participation is completely voluntary. There 
is no penalty for not participating.  
The purpose of this study is to get students to evaluate various messages. If you choose to 
participate, you will be asked to view several messages presented in the form of advisories. You 
will then be asked to answer a set of questions regarding the advisories. It will take about 15 
minutes to complete the entire questionnaire. You can stop at any time without penalty and you 
do not have to answer any question you do not wish to answer. 
All answers are confidential to the extent provided by law. There are no known risks associated 
with this study and there are no direct benefits to you for participation. No compensation will be 
provided for your participation. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Please read the following page and answer the questions. 
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Instructions: The majority of this questionnaire makes use of rating scales with seven 
places. Some of the questions may appear to be similar, but they do address somewhat 
different issues. Please read each question carefully, be sure to answer all items. Answer 
the questions to the best of your ability. 
Section I: Please answer the questions using the scale below. Please write the 
number that corresponds to your choice in the space preceding the question. 
 
1) Based on the weather advisory I read, I believe this situation qualifies as an 
emergency. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
2) I want to understand this emergency situation better. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
3) I cannot do anything about this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
4) I do not have the ability to make a difference in the outcome of this emergency 
situation.  
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
5) I don’t want any more information about this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
6) The National Weather Service has adequate expertise to handle this emergency 
situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
7) I do not understand this evacuation enough to do anything about it. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
8) The National Weather Service is a trustworthy organization. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
9) The National Weather Service is knowledgeable about emergency preparedness. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
10) I am personally affected by this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
11) I do not understand this emergency situation enough to do anything about it. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
12) This evacuation does not involve me. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
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13)  I recognize the existence of a weather-related emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
14) I need to seek out additional information to better understand this emergency 
situation.  
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
15) I believe that there are constraints or obstacles that limit my ability to evacuate. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
16) This emergency situation does not involve me. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
17) I have strong opinions about this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
18) The National Weather Service provides the most accurate information about 
emergency situations. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
19) I trust information provided by the National Weather Service. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
20) I am personally affected by this evacuation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
21) I don’t believe this emergency situation is serious. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
22) I plan to seek out additional information on ways I can better prepare for this 
emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
23) I believe that I am not able to evacuate. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
24) I will actively seek more information about this emergency situation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
25) The National Weather Service is a credible organization. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
 
26) I have strong opinions about evacuation. 
Strongly Disagree  __1__  :  __2__  :  __3__  :  __4__  :  __5__  :  __6__  :  __7__  Strongly Agree 
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Section II: Please answer the next set of questions to the best of your ability. 
 
Please place an ‘X’ on the line that best corresponds with your attitude toward the 
National Weather Service in this emergency situation. 
 
Bad ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Good 
Negative ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Positive 
Incompetent ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Competent 
Not important ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ Important 
 
 
 
Section III: Please answer the next set of questions that best applies to you. 
 
Sex: 
______ Male     _____  Female 
 
Age: ______ 
 
Race: 
_____ Caucasian     
_____ Hispanic      
_____ African-American      
_____ Asian         
_____ American Indian      
_____ Pacific Islander    
_____ Other 
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Highest level of education you have completed: 
 
______ High School Graduate 
______ Some college 
______ Trade/technical/vocational training 
______ College Graduate 
______ Some postgraduate work 
______ Post graduate degree 
 
Type of dwelling: 
 
______ House 
______ Condo 
______ Townhouse 
______ Apartment 
______ Mobile home 
______ Other 
 
Do you have children? 
 
______ Yes     _____ No 
 
Are you a registered voter? 
 
______ Yes     _____ No 
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Do you have an elderly relative that would need your assistance in the case of an 
emergency? 
 
______ Yes     _____ No 
Thank you for your time. Have a great day. 
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Appendix B: Controls 
Veteran Meteorologist Becomes Leader at NOAA’s 
National Weather Service Office in Milwaukee 
May 23, 2009 
Stephen Brueske, a meteorologist with 24 years of forecasting experience, begins his 
duties today as meteorologist in charge at NOAA’s Milwaukee National Weather Service 
forecast office.   
“Steve has worked at a variety of National Weather Service locations and brings a wealth 
of weather forecasting knowledge that will serve the people of southern and southeastern 
Wisconsin well,” said Lynn P. Maximuk, director of the 14-state National Weather 
Service central region.  
Brueske’s National Weather Service experience includes serving as a radar instructor at 
the warning decision training branch in Norman, Okla.; a term as science and operations 
officer at the Charleston, S.C., forecast office; and meteorologist in charge at the Great 
Falls, Mont., forecast office. Prior to his selection to lead the Milwaukee office, he was 
deputy chief of the systems operations division at western region headquarters in Salt 
Lake City. 
“One of the most important duties for any meteorologist in charge is to make sure area 
residents are promptly informed of changing weather conditions. This forecast office has 
a very talented staff with long-standing relationships with local government, emergency 
managers and the media and I look forward to working with all our partners to provide 
accurate and timely weather forecasts and warnings,” Brueske said.  
Brueske earned his Bachelor of Arts in chemistry, with a minor in computer science, 
from Bethel University in Minnesota. He studied atmospheric science at Creighton 
University, and received his master’s degree in meteorology from Penn State University 
in 1990. Prior to joining NOAA he served eight years in the U.S. Air Force as a weather 
officer. 
NOAA understands and predicts changes in the Earth's environment, from the depths of 
the ocean to the surface of the sun, and conserves and manages our coastal and marine 
resources. 
Note: Media interested in arranging interviews with Steve Brueske may contact the 
Milwaukee weather forecast office in Dousman at 262-965-5061 ext. 726. 
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Hillsborough County News Release, May 2, 2009 
For Immediate Release    
 
For media use only: 
Willie Puz, Public Information Manager 
Communications 
Telephone: 813-307-8379 
Cellular Phone: 813-546-2086    
 
Official County Hurricane Guides Now Available 
 
Hillsborough County's Emergency Management team works year round to ensure we are 
ready to respond to a hurricane or any other type of disaster. And we want you to be 
prepared, too. 
The 2009 Hurricane Guide, the Official Guide for the Tampa Bay Area is now available 
at local post offices, with local fire stations and libraries receiving them in the coming 
weeks. This Official Hurricane Guide, both in English and Spanish, covers all aspects of 
hurricane preparedness, from knowing your evacuation zone and what to take should you 
need to evacuate, to advice for homebound patients and protecting senior citizens and 
your pets. A full list of County shelters, with addresses, is also provided. 
In addition, the Guide offers ten reminders on actions to take now that will help keep you 
and your family and pets safe. 
Another opportunity to get your hurricane preparedness questions answered is at the May 
31 Tampa Bay Hurricane Expo at the Museum of Science and Industry. This free event is 
co-sponsored by Hillsborough County and the City of Tampa. You can learn more about 
hurricane preparedness and the Tampa Bay Hurricane Expo at 
www.TampaBayHurricaneExpo.com. 
XXX 
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Hillsborough County Government Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
Hillsborough County Government Office 
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make  
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. Please join 
the local             
government in 
evacuation efforts. 
Together we can 
protect the residents 
of our community. 
Your cooperation 
will ensure the 
safety of all        
residents as we   
prepare for the 
storm.  
Appendix C: Treatments  
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National Weather Service Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
National Weather Service                       
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make  
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. Please join 
the National 
Weather Service in 
evacuation efforts. 
Together we can 
protect the residents 
of our community. 
Your cooperation 
will ensure the 
safety of all        
residents as we   
prepare for the 
storm.  
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Hillsborough County Government Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
Hillsborough County Government Office 
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make  
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. Please check 
whether you reside 
in an evacuation 
zone and proceed to 
a safe destination. 
Our office has      
resources you may 
need to ensure your 
safety. If you need        
assistance, we will       
facilitate your       
evacuation. 
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National Weather Service Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
National Weather Service                      
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make  
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. Please check 
whether you reside 
in an evacuation 
zone and proceed to 
a safe destination. 
Our office has      
resources you may 
need to ensure your 
safety. If you need        
assistance, we will       
facilitate your       
evacuation. 
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Hillsborough County Government Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
Hillsborough County Government Office 
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make  
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. Current      
information          
indicates this storm 
may cause structural 
damage due to high 
winds, flash floods, 
storm surge and the 
possibility of         
tornados. 
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National Weather Service Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
National Weather Service                      
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make  
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. Current      
information          
indicates this storm 
may cause structural 
damage due to high 
winds, flash floods, 
storm surge and the 
possibility of         
tornados. 
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Hillsborough County Government Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
Hillsborough County Government Office 
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make   
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. Local      
government values 
your safety. Please 
evacuate              
immediately. Our 
shelters still have 
plenty of room. 
Please don’t risk 
your life thinking 
you can ride out the 
storm at home.  
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National Weather Service Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
National Weather Service                       
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make   
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. Local      
government values 
your safety. Please 
evacuate              
immediately. Our 
shelters still have 
plenty of room. 
Please don’t risk 
your life thinking 
you can ride out the 
storm at home.  
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Hillsborough County Government Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
Hillsborough County Government Office 
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make   
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. Local      
shelters currently 
can accommodate 
you and your     
family. If you 
evacuate your    
residence now, you 
will be protected 
from harm. At the 
shelters you will     
receive food, water, 
medicine and    
sleeping                
arrangements.  
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National Weather Service Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
National Weather Service                      
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make   
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. Local      
shelters currently 
can accommodate 
you and your     
family. If you 
evacuate your    
residence now, you 
will be protected 
from harm. At the 
shelters you will     
receive food, water, 
medicine and    
sleeping                
arrangements.  
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Hillsborough County Government Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
Hillsborough County Government Office 
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make  
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. If you don’t 
adhere to all 
evacuation       
warnings, those who 
stay in their homes 
will face certain 
death. There is no       
certainty that    
emergency rescue 
personal will be 
able to reach you if 
the situation         
deteriorates.  
107 
 
National Weather Service Hurricane Advisory 
Hurricane Jacob Intermediate Advisory 
National Weather Service                      
Tampa, FL – 1:00 P.M. EDT – Sept. 12, 2009 
At 1 p.m., Hillsborough County (Tampa Bay) 
was placed under a hurricane watch.         
Hurricane conditions are likely to occur 
within the next 36 hours.  
Hurricane Jacob is moving toward the east-
northeast near 12mph. A turn toward the east 
is expected later today. The center of Jacob 
will be near the entrance of Tampa Bay by 
late tomorrow. Because Jacob is a very large 
hurricane, weather will begin to deteriorate 
along the coastline soon.  
Data from Air Force reconnaissance planes 
indicate that maximum sustained winds      
remain near 115mph with pockets of higher 
gusts. Jacob is a category three hurricane on 
the Saffir-Simpson scale. This is a major   
hurricane; the damage level could be          
extensive.  
The storm is expected to produce a coastal 
storm surge up to 14 feet. Residents along the 
coast can expect to experience above normal 
tide and dangerous battering waves soon.  
Currently, water levels along the coast have 
already risen more than 3 feet. 
Hurricane Jacob is expected to produce     
rainfall amounts of 7 to 10 inches over west-
ern and central Florida.  
 
 
 
Hurricane JACOB 
A category three         
hurricane will make  
landfall in Tampa 
Bay in the next 36 
hours. If you don’t 
adhere to all 
evacuation       
warnings, those who 
stay in their homes 
will face certain 
death. There is no 
certainty that   
emergency rescue 
personal will be 
able to reach you if 
the situation         
deteriorates.  
